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Stochastic Demand, Inventory Management, 
and Chamberlinian Excess Capacity 
by 
Hans Haller and Daniel Orr * 
1. Introduction and Objectives 
A theorem from the nineteen thirties which has become a minor textbook canon 
in microeconomics states that in long run equilibrium, monopolistic ompeti- 
tion implies excess capacity in all individual firms. ί In a geometric analysis too 
familiar to replicate, Edward H. Chamberlin [1933] asserts that in markets 
with (1) numerous single plant, single product firms, (2) a market demand 
structure in which outputs of different firms are 'close but not perfect' substi- 
tutes (so that each firm faces a demand structure that is less than infinitely elastic 
in own price), and (3) free entry, the long run equilibrium of any supplier will 
be at a point of tangency between its demand curve and its long (and short) run 
average cost curve. It necessarily follows from the negative slope of the demand 
curve that (a) the plant of choice is underutilized, and (b) the plant of choice is 
smaller than the competitively optimal one. Chamberlin further speculated that 
this "excess capacity theorem" need not imply resource misallocation; product 
variety was seen as unobtainable without it.2 
To many economists, Chamberlin's large-group equilibrium is synonymous 
with monopolistic ompetition; and excess capacity is the most important 
economic implication ofthat equilibrium, in which (1) every firm perceives the 
finite-elasticity response of demand to own-price changes; (2) the firm's demand 
* We are indebted to Richard Ashley, James Friedman, Roderick Reasor, Nicolaus 
Tideman, and two referees for advice and beneficial critique. L See recent exts as diverse as Varian [1984] and wonnacott-wonnacott [1987] ior 
the importance now assigned to the excess capacity postulate, and Cassels [1937], Cham- 
berlin [1937], [1938], Kahn [1935], Kaldor [1935] for a tour of origins. z That particular insight has been made more precise in work by Dixit-Stiglitz [1977] 
and Lancaster [1979], [1980]. Dixit and Stiglitz express desirability of variety via convex- 
ity of utility functions. They present cases where (constrained) optimality of an allocation 
requires excess capacity and where equilibrium outputs are at or beyond the constrained 
optimal levels. Lancaster emphasizes diversity of tastes across consumers and arrives at 
similar conclusions: that optimality requires excess capacity; that sometimes monopolis- 
tic competition results in a sub-optimal configuration, with less excess capacity than at 
the social optimum. 
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curve shifts in response to price changes of other firms, or entry by other firms; 
(3) every firm in the 'group' (a set of firms producing closely substitutable output 
under very similar technological and cost conditions) maximizes profit with 
respect to own price and scale of plant; and (4) there are no profits anywhere 
in the group that could be dissipated by further entry (i.e., all firms earn zero 
profit net of imputable rents). 
This may be formalized: the vector of prices of all firms in a Chamberlinian 
group is P, a representative firm's demand function is q(W), its cost function is 
C[g(P)], and its own price is p. Chamberlinian equilibrium holds in the long run 
when 
(1) M*xn = pq(P)-C[q(F)] 
ρ 
is solved such that 
(2) π = 0, 
and when the cost function C is associated with an optimal scale of plant. The 
conditions (1) and (2) hold for all firms of the group. Excess capacity follows 
immediately from the MC = MR condition along with zero profit (AC = AR) 
so long as q' = dq/dp < 0, as is usual. 
A literature has grown sporadically since the nineteen fifties, which has tried 
to unseat the excess capacity theorem, through attempts to show that excess 
capacity ceases to hold as a condition of equilibrium if explicit analytical 
allowance is made for other cost-related features of monopolistic ompetition, 
such as advertising or differentiated product quality among firms. The excess 
capacity theorem has, however, survived those challenges. 3 
Like those efforts, this paper seeks to counter-exemplify excess capacity by 
enriching the firm's environment, in ways consistent with Chamberlin's vision. 
With U-shaped average cost curves and downward sloping demand curves, as 
we shall assume, an additional cost element not inherent in the production 
technology is needed to make the excess capacity theorem fail. Brand variety 
with spill-over between brands may do.4 So do demand shocks - or demand 
shocks buffered by inventory management. We will portray the firm as an 
expected-returns maximizer over time, facing a stochastic demand process 
(modelled in discrete time by a relation in which the firm's own price and mean 
quantity demanded per period of time are inversely related; and there is an 
additive random zero-mean quantity shock in each period). 
The modification i troduced here, stochastic demand, is a natural extension 
of Chamberlin's own analysis, which sought more realistic portrayals of the 
3 See Schmalensee [1972] and Margolis [1985] for analysis and references. 4 Margolis [1989] successfully follows this route which is a departure from the single 
product firm. 
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market process than monopoly or competition alone afforded. Most important- 
ly, Chamberlin's tangency solution is a product of Viner's [1931] famous enve- 
lope of U-shaped short run average cost curves; and (as Stigler [1939] argued 
in another famous old paper) it makes sense to adopt a production technology 
with U-shaped short run average cost only when the firm expects to vary output 
in the short run. Stigler identifies "capital flexibility" as a costly attribute which 
enables the firm to vary output without incurring severe cost penalties. When 
sales fluctuate stochastically and inventories are absent or costly to maintain at 
extremely high or low (negative) levels, output variation is necessary, and cap- 
ital flexibility is desirable. Heretofore there has been no explicit rationale for 
U-shaped short run average cost in the analysis of Chamberlinian firms, but our 
introduction of stochastic demand does provide an economic justification. 
The prevalent response to stochastic demand fluctuations, both in theory and 
in practice, is to introduce inventory: the firm's output has to be storable; the 
firm buffers against stochastic quantity shocks with finished goods inventory; 
the output rate adjusts to inventory movement through time as prescribed by 
'inventory theory'. The quantity-buffering ventory management considered 
below is a variant of normative production control analyses widely published 
in the management science literature for use by firms in the same kinds of 
branded goods markets which motivate Chamberlin's work. Our specific anal- 
ysis is abetted by a stylized and simple framework, drawn from yet more old 
work which in the last decade has enjoyed a vigorous revival, the quadratic 
criteria analysis of production and inventory planning, exemplified in the classic 
of Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon [I960]. 
One of the referees pointed out that our main conclusions might also be 
obtained with a zero inventory policy. The crucial fact in both cases is that the 
variance of demand enters the firm's expected operating cost linearly. 5 Since the 
zero inventory regime makes the analysis somewhat simpler and more transpar- 
ent, we deal with this regime first, in Section 7, before we turn to an inventory 
management regime in Section 8. Traditional inventory management has been 
and very likely will be the preferred response of most manufacturers todemand 
shocks. However, following the Japanese lead, an increasing number of US 
manufacturers opt for zero or close to zero inventory; the new technical term 
is 'just-in- time' (JIT). 6 Therefore, apart from being analytically convenient, he 
assumption of zero inventory is becoming empirically relevant. 
5 See equation (5). 
See Gilbert [1990]. The traditional procedure basically applies a batch-push system 
where parts are made and assembled in large batches and pushed to the next operation 
on a fixed schedule. Finished goods are stockpiled as inventory. Just-in-time production 
attempts to produce only the necessary products in the necessary quantities at the 
necessary time. It is a pull system which means that sub-assemblies, components, parts, 
and raw materials are pulled forward as they are needed in the next step of operation. In 
the ideal scenario, no inventories are accumulated (and no backlogs occur). 
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The following investigation of how a firm faced with stochastic demand 
would act in equilibrium, answers two questions related to excess capacity: will 
the firm, on average, necessarily operate at a production rate less than the 
average-cost minimizing rate in the plant of its choice; and will it necessarily 
choose a plant smaller in scale than one which yields the lowest possible cost 
per unit of output? Sections 2-5 introduce the model and provide general 
characterization results. Section 6, more specifically, defines and discusses a 
symmetric long-run equilibrium in a model with identical firms. Sections 7 and 
8 explore the more specific structure and counter-exemplify the excess capacity 
condition, for a JIT production schedule and for an intertemporal inventory 
management setting, respectively. Section 9 offers concluding remarks. 
When a firm faces stochastic demand fluctuations and maximizes net expect- 
ed revenue, the excess capacity condition, an average rate of production that lies 
to the left of the output level at which average production costs are minimized, 
can fail. The reason is that demand variance enters as a term in the expected 
operating cost formula (5). That term cannot be simply derived from the tech- 
nological specification of the plant, but is a consequence of stochastic demand. 
In the standard Chamberlinian analysis, the maximization of net return eces- 
sitates that a plant is operated at a rate at which unit costs of manufacture are 
falling. We will show here that when a stochastic element of demand imposes 
additional costs on the firm, none of which are direct costs of manufacture, 
expected returns maximization o longer implies that "excess capacity" condi- 
tion. At the very least, this demonstrates that a clean separation between 
cost-related and demand-related components in the firm's objective function 
cannot be relied on; cost no longer is a matter only of technological plant 
specification and input prices. The position of the average rate of production, 
relative to the technologically defined output level of minimum unit cost of 
output, can no longer be predicted for an equilibrated firm, unless its exact 
demand conditions are known. 7> 8 
The efficiency or social welfare consequences of this finding are obscure. 
Nonetheless, the finding prompts a new view of branded goods markets which 
promises to improve our understanding of those markets in a significant way, 
as follows. With the costs of meeting demand variation incorporated into the 
analysis, it is no longer true that firms can be charged with producing too little 
output in too small a plant at too high a cost, and selling it at too high a price, 
even at the level at which that charge is true in the standard Chamberlinian 
7 These observations could also be relevant for empirical studies of capacity choice and 
capacity utilization. 8 de Vany-Saving's [1983] model remotely resembles ours. Although they consolidate 
technological production costs and demand-related costs, they counter the excess capac- 
ity condition. The reason is that in their model, capacity choice influences the expected 
waiting time for customers; consumers consider waiting time as a quality parameter and 
adjust their demand (decision to join a particular queue) accordingly. Hence a novel link 
between capacity choice and demand is postulated. 
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analysis. One of the "costs of variety" in branded goods markets is the main- 
tenance of stock levels or the fulfillment ofdelivery times to avoid customer 
disaffection. Accompanying the sale of branded goods is demand fluctuation, 
represented (albeit imperfectly no doubt) herein by an additive i. i. d. error term. 
It may be unnecessary to search for a reasonable tradeoff between variety and 
excess capacity; survival in a branded goods market may depend more on 
logistics (along lines suggested in our analysis below) than on capacity. Logis- 
tics, like capacity, is a use of resources; but those resources are probably less 
brand specific than capacity, and more readily transferred to other uses in the 
event of brand failure. 
2. Demand Uncertainty 
Analysis of stochastic demand begins with one of the firms in a Chamberlinian 
group that is equilibrated in the long run. That is, prices, inventory maintenance 
decisions, physical plant investment, advertising, product quality and other 
choices affecting competition or cost within the group are assumed to be in long 
run equilibrium. We will explicitly consider price, output, inventory mainte- 
nance (when applicable) and plant scale decisions, but none of the other compet- 
itive dimensions. Let x* denote the scale of plant and ρ denote the price of the 
firm under consideration. The demand process faced by a representative firm is 
of the form 
(3) ft = í(P) + fi|, í = 1,2,..., 
where Ρ is the vector of group equilibrium prices (which includes the firm's own 
price), and {et} is a sequence of independent, identically distributed random 
variables with zero mean and finite variance V> 0. 
The firm seeks production rate and inventory level sequences which minimize 
expected cost of operation. The period t cost of producing depends on the 
output rate xt in that period and is 
(4) axt + b{xt-x*)' 
where a and b (b > 0) are parameter values when the firm has competitive 
market access to all variable inputs, and x* is the plant scale parameter (iden- 
tical with the short run minimum-average-cost u put rate). The plant scale x* 
is a choice variable considered explicitly in Section 5. For now x* ist taken as 
exogenous and assumed to be survivable, i.e. capable of yielding normal returns 
in long run equilibrium. The period t operating cost of the firm is denoted yt: 
it is given by (4) plus eventual inventory costs. We proceed under the assump- 
tion that the expected period t operating cost takes the general form 
(5) Eyt = aq + φ(ξ - χ*)2 + ΘΥ 
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with φ > 0 and θ > 0. In the sequel, we determine the coefficients φ and θ for 
two prominent operating regimes: a 'just-in-time' production schedule in Sec- 
tion 7 and an 'optimal partial adjustment rule' in Section 8. 
3. Properties of Equilibrium Price 
Section 2 presumes a specific plant such that the firm's actual cost of production 
at the rate xt is (4), with a, b, and x* treated as given parameters. In contrast, 
the firm faces the expected operating cost (5) which is obtained after an 'optimal' 
inventory-output response to stochastic demand, with plant scales and equilib- 
rium prices fixed throughout the group. The functional form (5) explicitly 
reflects the effects of the firm's price choice. The firm's chosen price, in the 
stochastic version of Chamberlinian equilibrium, will maximize its expected net 
revenue; but because of the entry and equilibrium price decisions of all firms, 
expected net revenue will be zero. The stochastic market equivalent of (1) and 
(2) then is, with D the firm's discount factor, 0 < D < 1, 
(6) Max En = Ε £ D'^foCP) · Ρ - yt] = 0 . 
Ρ f=l 
Using (5) and suppressing the discount factor D, the maximand (6) becomes 
(7) Max En = ρ · q(F) - aq(W) - φ · (g(P) - x*)2 -9V. 
ρ 
The firm and group are in equilibrium when every firm has chosen its com- 
ponent of Ρ to satisfy (7) and when every firm's choice of plant is consistent with 
♦ meeting demand at minimum cost. In a representative firm, those decentralized 
choices result in zero maximum expected profit. Hence the equilibrium condi- 
tions are, with q' = dq/dp: 
(8) dEn/dp = q + (p - a)q' - 2q^(q - x*) = 0 ; 
(9) Εη = (ρ-α)ξ-φ(ξ- χ*)2 - θ V= 0 . 
4. Utilization of the Chosen Plant 
Let ρ and q denote the values which solve (8) and (9). (This may be thought of 
as price being the choice of the firm, and the associated mean quantity de- 
manded being determined by the process of profit-dissipating entry.) Let again 
q' = dq/dp < 0 be the slope of the firm's demand with respect to its own price 
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p, evaluated at the equilibrium values. From (8) and (9), we have that 
(10) q = [- q'(<t>x*2 + eV)/(i - <t>qf)]112 . 
In order for the excess capacity theorem to hold, it is necessary that q < x*. 
Obviously no such necessity holds here. Indeed, if q2 < - q'9V, then also 
q > x*. This result is a 
Theorem. In a plant whose scale x* is consistent with long run equilibrium, 
the likelihood that q> x* increases with - q' the absolute value of the partial 
slope of the (mean) demand function g(P), and with V, the variance of the 
demand process. 
The proof of the theorem is immediate from (10). The intuitive basis of that 
result is clear. In the deterministic Chamberlin world, the steeper the demand 
curve (whose slope is l/q% the farther to the left on the AC curve the point of 
tangency occurs, and the greater the degree of excess capacity.9 That effect is 
preserved her. Variance is seen in (5) to contribute to expected operating cost. 
In the process of group equilibration, the firms's demand curve is shifted own- 
ward by entry so long as there are positive xpected excess returns. The greater 
the costs imposed by variance, the smaller that downward shift, and the greater 
the likelihood of q > x*. 
So, our first finding is that mean output can exceed the minimum-average- 
cost output rate within a survivable plant whose technical cost specification is 
given by (4). But will equilibrium nevertheless always occur in a plant that is 'too 
small', so that excess capacity remains in the long run with reference to a 
competitively scaled plant? That question is taken up next. 
5. Choice of a "Too Small" Plant 
In Chamberlin's depiction of the process of equilibration, it is strongly implied 
that entry or exit in the group is accompanied by moves to smaller sized plants 
in the ongoing firms. He views those adjustments toward small plants as the 
more important component of excess capacity from the standpoint of resource 
use; under-use of the chosen plant, the problem studied in the preceding section, 
is a secondary component of excess capacity. 
Exploration continues, then, with the introduction of an explicit quadratic 
long run cost envelope curve. The fixed cost coefficient is positive; otherwise 
there is no minimum average cost output to measure capacity by. So despite the 
9 When drawing a demand curve, we follow the convention of partial equilibrium 
analysis. That is the firm's price is depicted on the vertical axis, whereas quantity is 
depicted on the horizontal axis. 
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maxim that there are no fixed costs in the long run, we introduce a cost 
component C which can be taken as start-up costs associated with any finite 
production rate, however small, and which is avoidable by shutdown. In 
(11) LRTC = Ax2 + Bx + C, 
the coefficient sign restrictions A, B9 C > 0 assure that marginal cost is positive 
and rising for all x; and Β > 0 is further necessary in order that average cost be 
positive at its minimum value. 
Next, define a parametrized family of short run total cost curves 
(12) SR TCk = akx + b{x- x?)2 
whose envelope is (11). The minimum point for average cost on each short run 
curve is x£. The index k is conveniently chosen to be the slope of LRAC at xk, 
the point of tangency with SRACk. Thus if x0 is the minimum point of LRAC, 
then x0 is both the point of tangency οι LRAC with S R A Co and the minimum 
point of SRAC0: x0 = xj. 
Examine that minimum point x$. We have LRAC = SRAC = 0, i.e. 
A - C/x2 = b(x2 - xt2)/x2 = 0 
at χ = x0, so 
(13) xo = x* = (CA4)1/2. 
Moreover, SRAC is more convex than LRAC, i.e. 
SRAC" > LRAC" >0; 
so bxl2 > C, or b > A. 
Next consider the SRACk curve. Its minimum point is x£. We have that 
(14) Ax2 + Bxk + C = akxk 4- b(xk - x?)2 
and, from LRAC = SRAC = k, 
A-C/x2k=b(x2k-xt2)/x2 = k, 
which implies k < A, since C > 0; and further C = (A - k)/xk and 
x2 = C/(A -k) = bx*2/(b - k) 
which in turn gives 
(15) x* = [(b-k)C/(A-k)b]112. 
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Note that xk increases and x£/xfc decreases as k increases. From (14) and 
LRMC = SRMC at xk follows 
2Axk + Β = ak + 2b(xk - x?) or 
Next, to simplify further, we linearize the firm's partial demand relation: 
q = F-fP- 
The maximand (7), with the scale variable k introduced as a decision variable, 
then is 
Max En = (p - ak) · (F -/p) - 0(F -/p - x*)2 - θ V 
The three conditions which now characterize long run equilibrium are 
(17) £π = 0, 
(18) dEn/dp = F - 2fp +fak + 20/(F -/p - xf) = 0 , 
(19) οΕπ/ô/c = 20(F -/p - x*) dx^/dk - (F -fp) dajdk = 0 . 
The three variables that adjust to meet these conditions are k, p, and F, the 
demand curve intercept (which is shifted by entry). 
The two matters to investigate are: (a) Can the three long run equilibrium 
conditions hold when k > 0? (b) If so, can the result q > χξ be observed with 
k > 0? That investigation proceeds by substituting q = F -fp back into (17)- 
(19) and eliminating the terms (p - ak) from (17) and (18). The resulting expres- 
sions, using 
dxt/dk = (b-A)- Ci/2/2(A - k)3/2[b (b - k)]1/2 and 
dajdk = (b - A) ■ C1/2[b1/2 ~(b- k)l/2]/(A - k)3/2(b - k)l/2 
are 
(20) [φ(ξ - x*)2 + θ V]/q = q/f+ 2φ(ξ - χ*) 
and 
(21) <t>(q-xÍ) = q[b-bí/2(b-k)V2]. 
From (21), q > xf iff k> 0; and if k = 0, q = xj. (20) is a quadratic in 
A = q - xf , with roots 
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Δ = q + q[H2 - HißV/q - q/f)/q'm/2<l>. 
If the positive sign is used, Δ is of the order of 2q9 which is unlikely. Using 
the negative sign, we have that 
Δ>0 iff q2<f9V 
Since here - q' = - dq/dp =/, the finding of Section 4 is confirmed. The 
likelihood of q > x* increases with the absolute value of the partial slope of the 
(mean) demand function and with the variance of the demand process. 
6. Structure of Equilibrium 
To illustrate and substantiate our previous analysis, we are going to show, for 
particular parameter values, the existence of a long run equilibrium with q > xf. 
To this end, we simplify a step further by assuming all firms identical and each 
one exposed to a residual demand of the form 
F = gp 
with g a constant and ρ the 'average price'. If individual firms are negligibly 
small, ρ means the group's average price; otherwise ρ stands for the average 
price of the group, excluding the representative firm. The conditions defining 
symmetric long run equilibrium are: 
(22) (p, k) e argmax En, En = 0, and ρ = ρ . 
In such an equilibrium, all firms face the same partial demand schedule 
q(p) = F -fp = g ρ -fp; each firm chooses the profit maximizer (that is ex- 
pected revenue maximizer) (p, fc) and the average price ρ happens to be equal to 
p. Thus the firms operating in the market play a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
point of the strategic game with (p, fc)-strategy space(s) and payoff unction(s) 
En. Moreover, each operating firm makes a normal profit equal to zero: 
En = 0. A potential entrant, if it is an identical clone of the firms already in the 
market, would also face the partial demand schedule q(p) = g ρ -fp and at best 
make zero profit. In this sense, the equilibrium precludes profitable ntry. 
7. Existence of Equilibrium: 'Just-In-Time9 Production Schedule 
In this section, we assume that the representative firm produces to order or 
'just-in-time'. We further assume, as in Section 6, that all firms are identical 
clones and face a linear demand curve of the form q(p) = F -fp = g ρ -/p. We 
want to show that for specific parameter values, there exists a symmetric long 
run equilibrium with q > xf. 
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First of all, our foregoing analysis applies, when the firm follows a 'just-in- 
time' production schedule. For then a short run production cost function (4) 
leads to an expected operating cost function (5) with φ = θ = b. Now we are 
ready to state a 
Theorem. There are values of the parameters A, B, C, ft,/, g, and Κ such that 
a symmetric long run equilibrium with q > x* exists. 
Proof. Put A = ft/2, Β = 6, C = b = 1.25, / = 0.2. With these parametric 
choices, φ = θ = 1.25 and If φ = 0.5. Further, the condition k < A becomes 
k < ft/2 and (15) becomes 
(2T' **2 - b~k 
χξ is increasing in k with xJ->lasfc-> - oo and xj* -> oo as k -* ft/2. From 
(23), 
, b xf2-2 . b , b 1 fc =2xrn and 2-fc 
= 
2xF^T· 
Therefore (16) yields 
(24) ak = Β - ft y/2 - (x?2 - 1)1/2 + 2ftx? . 
Now we are prepared for an explicit solution of the problem Max Ε π. Rear- 
ranging terms yields 
(25) En = - p2r + psk - dk - θ V 
with r=/+0/2 = l/4, 
s* = F + afc/+2/0(F-xk*), 
dk = akF + 0(F-xk*)2. 
Let us first maximize En with respect to p, given k. The solution is given by the 
first order condition 
2pr = sk or ρ = sk/2r 
and therefore 
s2 
(26) En(k) = -±-dk-eV, 
provided sk > 0. (Otherwise ρ = 0 is optimal. This possibility will be excluded 
later.) Hence, with/= 0.2, φ = 1.25, 2/φ = 0.5, and r = 1/4, one obtains 
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(27) En{k) = sl-dk-eV 
= (1.5 · F + 0.2 · ak - 0.5 · x?)2 - ak F - 1.25 · (F - χ?)2 -9V. 
Using (24), (27) can be expressed in terms of x? only: 
(28) En(xi) = (1.5 · F + | Β - I ^2 · (xk*2 - I)1/2)2 
- (J5 - b JÏ · (x?2 - 1)1/2 + 2b xi ) F - 1.25 · (F - χ? )2 -ÖF. 
Let ̂  solve s, = 0. 
Lemma 1. For F = 16, .Ε π (χ?) attains a maximum and all its maximizers x* 
satisfy 2 < x* < xf. 
Proof. Postponed to the appendix. Q.E.D. 
Next fix F = 16 and choose a corresponding maximizer x* of £π(χ£). For 
x* = 3 or k = ^6, 52 - át = [25.2 - I]2 - 16 · [6 + 2b] - 1.25 · 132 > 0. 
Hence s2 - dm>sl - dk> 0. Choose V= Θ'1 · [s2 - í/J. Then 
(29) £π(χ*) = 0. 
Since x* < x?, sm > 0. Put p = p = 2sm and g = 8/5m. Then F = gp = 16 and 
(30) p = p. 
It remains to be shown that, indeed, 
(31) (p, x*) e argmax En, if F = 16 . 
It suffices to exclude the possibility ρ = 0 when maximizing (25). By (24) and 
(25), Επ(0, xf ) = - dfc - θ V< 0, whatever xf. Since Ε π = 0 can be achieved, 
choosing ρ = 0 is sub-optimal. 
Finally, x* > y/l = xg implies m > 0. Hence, by (21), 
(32) q>x* for /c = m. 
As asserted by the theorem, we have found parameters and ρ = p = 2sm,k = m 
such that the long run equilibrium conditions (22) are satisfied with capacity xf 
less than permanent demand q - F -fp = gp -fp. Q.E.D. 
8. Existence of Equilibrium: Intertemporal Inventory Management 
In this section, we assume that the representative firm engages in intertemporal 
inventory management to buffer demand shocks. Costs of maintaining (or 
running out of) inventory in period t are given by 
(33) h(I,-I*)2, 
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h > 0 and /* parameters. The inventory process is subject to the material 
balance identity 
(34) It = It-i +**-*, 
where qt is realized period t demand, generated by the process (3). There are no 
nonnegativity constraints on inventory. (But normally large back-order accu- 
mulations will be very costly.) 
From (4) and (33), the period t operating cost of the firm amounts to 
(35a) yt = axt + b(xt - x*)2 + h(It - J*)2 ,
and the total expected operating cost over an infinite horizon is given by 
(35b) Êí^ír1^, 
where D is the firm's discount factor, 0 < D < 1. We assume that the firm 
determines its production schedule by the 'partial adjustment rule' 
(36a) xt = í-a(/t_1-/*)2,í = l,2,..., 
where α is determined by the coefficients ofthe objective function: 
(36 b) α = {( W2 [4 + (h/b)]1'2 - (h/b)}/2 . 
Note that 0 < α < 1 for all b > 0 and h > 0. In an ealier version of this paper, 
we resort o old-established inventory theory as in Holt et al. [1960] and show 
that (36) is the limit of the optimal adjustment rule as D -» 1. It can also be 
shown to be optimal over an undiscounted finite horizon. Use of (36) can be 
justified on the ground that the scheduling interval will be a short period of time, 
e.g. a week; and hence the discount factor will differ only very slightly from 1. 
A scheduling rule of the form (36), when demand is a stationary process, 
implies a stochastic steady state, in which inventory levels and output rates can 
be predicted up to probability distributions, which depend on q and V, the 
moments of the demand process. Those relations are made explicit in 
Lemma 2. When a production scheduling rule of the form (36) is applied, the 
first wo moments of the output and inventory processes {xt} and {/J are, 
respectively, 
(37a) Ex = q, Vx = a2F/[l - (1 - a)2]; 
(37b) EI = I*--(q- x*), V, = V/[l - (1 - a)2], 
where q and Fare the first wo moments of the demand process (3). 
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Proof. Published by Harlan D. Mills [1967]. Q.E.D. 
Now for the firm with plant scale x*, production cost function (4) and inven- 
tory management cost function (33), the expected operating cost in period t is 
Eyt = E[axt + b(xt - x*)2 + h(It - /*)2], 
and when the decision rule (36) is used, we can substitute from (37) to get the 
functional form (5) with 
(38) φ = b + h/a2 > 0, θ = (b a2 4- h)/[l - (1 - a)2] > 0 . 
Again, we obtain a 
Theorem. There are values of the parameters A, B, C, b,f, g, h, and Fsuch that 
a symmetric long run equilibrium with q> x* exists. 
Sketch of Proof. Put A = 6/2, B = 6,C = b,f= 1/6, φ = 3. With β2 = h/b, 
one gets α = '{β · (4 + j52)1/2 - β% φ = b'(l+ β2 /α2). Choosing β = ±9 one 
gets α « 0.221, 1 + j82/a2 « 2.283. Hence 0 = 3 requires b =  - - « 1.314 1 + jS2/a2 
and h = ß2b « 0.082. Choose these values for b and h. After these parameter 
choices, the remainder of the proof parallels the one in the previous section. 
Details are provided in an earlier draft of the paper. Q.E.D. 
9. Concluding Remarks and Qualifications 
This is not the first inquiry into excess capacity in a stochastic demand setting, 
or in an inventory-holding firm. But it is the first fully dynamic model which 
considers excess capacity, inventories, and stochastic demand. Gould [1978], in 
a model with inventories and stochastic demand, finds, in passing, that the 
Chamberlin theorem holds up. His model, though multi-period, is not inter- 
temporal: it is a variant of the 'newsboy problem' of Laderman, Littauer and 
Weiss [1953]; goods put into stock for sale on day t cannot be sold on day t + 1. 
Nor is there any price-searching behavior, or group price equilibration in 
Gould's model. 
Drèze and Gabszewicz [1967] also find in favor of necessary excess capacity. 
Their cubic cost firm, though facing stochastic demand, shares its market with 
producers of identical goods, and cannot store output for future sales. Their 
model omits the vague Chamberlinian interplay of prices among differentiated- 
product suppliers that has been modelled in this paper by negatively sloped 
demand and zero long run profit; the products within their group are perfect 
substitutes. 
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In contrast, the crucial elements of this model are producer response to 
stochastic demand (under the JIT regime or under an inventory management 
regime) and the Chamberlin large-group hypothesis of competition with some 
vestigial price inelasticity to exploit, but less than oligopolistic dependency. The 
quadratic example shows that 'excess capacity' can no longer be concluded. The 
result suggests that the equilibria of large-group monopolistically competitive 
and perfectly competitive firms may be less different in terms of allocative 
implications than had previously been believed, even by those most ready to 
question the importance of those differences. 
Summary 
A model of the firm is presented which preserves the three crucial features of 
Chamberlinian large-group equilibrium (numerous firms, free entry, finite de- 
mand elasticity), but which also stipulates additive i.i.d. stochastic demand 
shocks in discrete time. Storable, but not necessarily stored output is consid- 
ered. Production costs are assumed to be quadratic and non-stochastic. In such 
a regime it is found that the excess capacity theorem need not hold: mean 
output rates can exceed the minimum average cost level of output in both the 
short run and the long run. 
Zusammenfassung 
Es wird ein Modell der Unternehmung mit den drei entscheidenden Eigenschaf- 
ten des Gleichgewichts großer Gruppen im Sinne von Chamberlin (zahlreiche 
Firmen, freier Marktzutritt, endliche Nachfrageelastizität) vorgestellt. Zusätz- 
lich werden additive, identisch und unabhängig verteilte stochastische Nach- 
frageschocks in diskreter Zeit vorausgesetzt. Der Output is lagerbar, wobei 
nicht unbedingt Lagerhaltung betrieben wird. Die Produktionskostenfunktion 
ist quadratisch und nicht stochastisch. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen braucht 
das „Excess Capacity Theorem" nicht zu gelten: Kurzfristig und langfristig 
kann die mittlere Outputrate größer sein als das Produktionsniveau, welches 
die Stückkosten minimiert. 
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1 
Let F = 16. Ε π (χ?) as given by (28) is differentiable and 
dEn - = - 2s* · Cl - f>F · c2 + 2.5 · (F - xf), with 
sk = '.5-F + 'B-'j2{xî2-'Yi' 
c 1 -i W β- 
χ* 
(x?2-l)1/2' 
c2 = 2-72-(jcf2_*1)1/2. 
ί/Επ dEn 
It suffices to show that  > 0 for xf < 2 and  < 0 for xjf > xf. Recall 
B = 69b = 1.25. áx? dxt 
Case 1. x? < 2. 
Then 0 < 25fc < 56 and 
^ι=ΐ>/^'(χ?2^)1/2. 
ί/Επ 
Collecting negative terms (neg) of-- yields 
wXj^ 
2?|iieg| = 2jtc1+2tF^40+14-V2- a^1)i/a. 









since 1 < xf < 2 implies ^2 ̂  > 2 . 
Hence I1 pos > Σ |neg| and -- - > 0 . 
k 
Case 2. xf > x?. 
Then i ̂  · x? > i 72 · «2 - 1)1/2 
^25 ·2'*^ 71' (xF^ïF ^ (7ï^ < 1001' 
/2 
s* < 0, 'st' < i V2 · x?, Cl < γ 
· 1.001. 
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Collecting positive terms of- - yields 
dxk 





+ 68.32 < 0.126 χ* + 68.32. 
Collecting negative terms yields 
£|neg| = 2bF + 2.5 xf = 40 + 2.5 xf > 1.5 xf + 111. 
dEn 
Thus Σ |neg| > Σ pos and -- < 0. Q.E.D. dxt 
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